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Abstract We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for
their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual
members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their
fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of en-
try on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry
takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive
lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus
created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status
distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
JEL Classiﬁcation D02 · D71 · L22
Keywords Academic faculties · University governance · Status organizations · Labor
market competition
1 Introduction
In human capital intensive industries recruitment decisions are a crucial organizational task
inﬂuencing decisively the quality of the main factor of production and, hence, the capabili-
ties and performance of the organization. In many academic faculties recruitment decisions
are delegated from the administrators to the academic staff. Masten (2006) shows empir-
ically that this is most pronounced in large research universities, as compared to liberal
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arts colleges and more specialized organizations. In research universities the collaboration
among faculty members inﬂuences research output, which has an effect on the utility of an
individual member. Thus, by making recruitment decisions, faculty members decide on their
own well-being in the future.
Academic faculties may be viewed in part as “status organizations” in the sense of Hans-
mann (1986): the value of collaboration among faculty members depends in part on their
joint abilities, which can be presumed to be strongly correlated with their external profes-
sional status.1 Hence, status is considered to be a proxy for the abilities of faculty members
(most notably in the research dimension). The higher the status of an individual member,
the more valuable this member is for others.
Status is a vertically differentiable good, characterized by some degree of rivalry. The
larger the number of members that interact with one person, the less valuable this interac-
tion becomes individually. Although as researchers we experience and participate in recruit-
ment decisions frequently, a theoretical framework that takes into account the speciﬁcs of
individual collaboration between highly skilled workers is missing.
We concentrate on two questions. First, what are the implications of competition among
faculties for the allocation of new researchers? For instance, will top Ph.Ds join the best or
just second-tier universities and for what wage? Second, what effects does the entry of a
new member have on the joint surplus of incumbent faculty members and the new member
himself?
Concentrating on majority voting, we will show that the job candidates (researchers)
with the highest status levels join the faculty with the highest average status. Candidates
with lower status levels either join the faculty of lesser average status or are not accepted by
any faculty at all. New faculty members with low status levels are unable to appropriate any
surplusfromjoiningafaculty.Incontrast,newmemberswithhighstatusareprotectedbythe
competition that arises amongst the faculties and are thereby able to share the surplus with
incumbent faculty members. We show that only faculties with symmetric status distributions
maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
We model competition for candidates in a two-faculty framework. The two faculties with
a given number of incumbent members with given status levels differ in their average status.
A high average status faculty (e.g., Harvard University) competes with a faculty of lower av-
erage status (e.g., State University X). Incumbent members trade off the utility they receive
from the average status of the other members of their faculty, which has implications for
the success of joint research projects, against alternative uses of the hiring budget if no new
member enters the faculty. We show that faculty members with low status beneﬁt more from
joint research than members with high status. This advantage is diluted more than propor-
tionally by the entry of new members with low status. Hence, we ﬁnd somewhat surprisingly
that low status members are more reluctant to allow candidates to enter the faculty than high
status members.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of the
related literature. In Sect. 3, we outline the baseline model and study competition between
two faculties. In Sect. 4, we characterize the equilibrium in this setup and analyze the alloca-
tion of surplus. In Sect. 5, we discuss the robustness of our main assumptions; we conclude
and sketch alternative applications of our model in Sect. 6. All proofs and alternative model
speciﬁcations are in the Appendices A and B.
1In Sect. 6, we outline further applications of our model, such as clubs and international economic organiza-
tions (e.g. WTO, ECU).Public Choice
2 Related literature
In order to place our approach in the context of the existing literature we stress upfront
the key properties and the main distinguishing features of our model. They are as follows.
(i): Status is a one-dimensional, vertically differentiable type variable. Hence, the relative
preference ordering of access to a candidate among incumbent members, and vice versa,
is equal. All players are endowed exogenously with status, that is, we do not allow them
to invest in status. (ii): Making use of the status of a fellow faculty member incurs a cost
(for the remaining faculty members) because it dilutes the value of interaction with this fel-
low, which makes status a rival good. (iii): The actual payoff created by using all faculty
members’ status differs among individuals because, from the perspective of a lesser ranked
member, the average status value of his fellows is greater than from the perspective of a
highly ranked member. (iv): The status utility of faculty members is not perfectly trans-
ferable as we consider a friction between the payment of money and the consumption of
perks.
We can identify several different branches of literature related to our work. First, the
seminal works on the economic theory of clubs were published in the 1960s. Most notably,
Buchanan (1965)a n dO l s o n( 1965) initiated a wave of research on the economic theory of
clubs and club goods, which was to be further developed in the decades following (see San-
dler and Tschirhart 1980, and Cornes and Sandler 1996: Chap. 11). As in Ellickson et al.
(1999), we deal with the individual characteristics of new and incumbent faculty members
and the interrelation of a faculty’s aggregate characteristics and its competition for new can-
didates. In contrast to those authors, we do not calculate the optimal faculty size explicitly.
We do, however, characterize the equilibrium level of wages paid to new candidates. Helsley
and Strange (1991) also examine discriminating pricing schemes, but our paper goes further
and studies the allocation of surplus within the faculties.
A second strand of the literature covers the dynamic aspects of clubs’ decision-making
rules and admission of new members. Sobel (2001) focuses on multidimensional character-
istics and heterogeneous preferences of members showing the circumstances under which
status level thresholds that have to be met by candidates increase or decrease over time.
Barbera et al. (2001) and Cai and Feng (2007) offer related approaches analyzing the effects
of various interest groups within a club on entrance of new members in equilibrium. Apart
from the fact that we do not model dynamic aspects explicitly, our model contrasts with
respect to characteristics (i) and partly (iii).
Third, our paper builds on the idea of clubs as status organizations, a notion introduced
by Hansmann (1986: 22), who refers to “clubs” as a “prototypical example of status organi-
zations”. Hansmann, however, regards the formation of a club system while we assume that
clubs—or faculties—already exist and study the competition among them.
The papers most closely related to ours are two by Epple and Romano (1998, 2008), who
analyze the competition among private and public schools for students in a world where
peer effects make school quality dependent on the composition of the abilities of a school’s
student body. Epple and Romano (1998) argue in their theoretical analysis that competition
between tax-ﬁnanced public schools and proﬁt-maximizing private schools leads the latter
to skim off the wealthiest and most able students.2 Epple and Romano (2008) study the im-
pact of the design of educational vouchers on the stratiﬁcation of students across schools and
2This argument neglects, however, the positive effect that competition between public and private schools has
on public-school effectiveness. This competitive effect might potentially overcompensate the sorting effect
and lead to higher performance of public schools in a competitive environment. See, for instance, Hoxby
(1996) and Couch et al. (1993).Public Choice
show that, by adding restrictions like tuition constraints, vouchers can capture the beneﬁts
without promoting greater stratiﬁcation of school competition. Masten (1995) is related to
these articles as he studies the impact of ﬁnancial aid coordination among a group of top
US universities and argues that the speciﬁc characteristics of the higher education industry
are difﬁcult to reconcile with traditional cartel theory. We differ signiﬁcantly by proposing
a formal model that analyzes competition among faculties that have similar objective func-
tions and where faculty decisions are determined by incumbent members rather than by a
proﬁt-maximizing investor.
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical investigations of governance struc-
tures in universities. By looking into the functions and limitations of democratic governance
structures in US universities, Masten (2006) shows that democratic decision-making pro-
cesses are hindered by neither the size of the organization nor the heterogeneity of its voting
members. Rather he ﬁnds that large universities with heterogeneous departments have more
democratic structures in place than small, homogeneous colleges. Against this background
he looks into the function of such democratic processes. We complement his analysis to a
certain extent. Rather than focusing on democratic decision processes per se, we look into
the implications of different (democratic) governance structures. We thereby focus on the
input market: the decisions of universities and faculties to hire new faculty members.
3 The model
We model two academic faculties, j ∈{ A,B}, which compete for a new researcher. Individ-
uals are, with the exception of their status positions, identical. The status position describes
their relative value for fellow scholars in social exchange processes and can be attributed to
a wide set of characteristics such as methodological and writing skills as well as network
relations.
The status positions of incumbent members are drawn from a distribution over the inter-
val [s, ¯ s]. Faculty j has Nj incumbent members, where Nj is a ﬁnite number. The member
of faculty j with the highest status is called ¯ nj, its member with the lowest status is nj,a n d
its member with median status is mj (see details below). We assume simple majority voting
in both faculties and denote the aggregate status of all incumbent members of faculty j by 
j si,w h e r esi is the status of member i. Setup costs are sufﬁciently large such that it is
prohibitive for a subset of members (or new candidates) to form a third faculty.
Each faculty has access to a given total budget for recruiting new researchers, T ≥ 0,
which it is assigned exogenously by its university’s executive board. To focus on the impact
of status differences on the competitive outcome, we assume that recruitment budgets in
both faculties are the same. Each faculty may offer a new researcher (candidate C)aw a g e
Wj ≤ T.Thefacultiesareprohibitedfromdistributingtheremaining T −Wj amongexisting
members.3 This restriction implies that the value of a dollar of the residual budget for each
member of faculty j is αT/Nj,w h e r eα ∈[ 0,1). In order to facilitate our analysis we
assume that α is identical across faculties.
By means of collaboration and social exchange, faculty members can increase their re-
search output and, hence, their well-being. This effect hinges on the average status of the
3For instance, the remaining budget can be used only to cover departmental operating costs, pay for travel
to conferences, the purchase of computer software or datasets, and the like. In many cases, faculties do
not increase budgets after failed searches but do get such increases after faculty members have left and the
position remains vacant. We summarize these effects in the parameter α.Public Choice
other faculty members, where status is a rival good: each member has a ﬁxed amount of
resources (time) to interact with his fellows. If the size of the faculty increases, opportuni-
ties to interact with a given colleague decrease, on average. This interpretation of the status
variable, as a rival good, is different from status being equal to reputation, a nonrival good.
Nonrivalry of status would imply in our setting, that the sum of the status levels of all other
members rather than the average status of all other faculty members should be the argument
in the individual member’s utility function. In the robustness section of our paper, we argue
that the paper’s main results are unchanged if status is treated as a partially nonrival good.4
We assume that, in expectation, collaboration among faculty members is uniformly dis-
tributed. Therefore, in expectation, each member gains an equal share of a fellow’s time
reserved for collaboration.5 Cooperation is more productive and valuable for each member
the higher is the social status of his/her counterpart. Hence, we depict the utility function of
a particular incumbent member k of faculty j as:6
u
k
j =ˆ s
k
j +α

T −Wj
Nj

, (1)
where ˆ sk
j denotes the average status of all the other members in faculty j from the point of
view of faculty member k. The marginal rate of substitution between status and money is
constant for all players and, hence, independent of a member’s own status. The introduction
of α makes status and money imperfect substitutes. Note that we could have formalized this
notion either by assuming concave utility in status or convex operating costs (with respect
to the number of faculty members). Introducing α<1 instead involves signiﬁcantly less
calculus.
Furthermore, our utility function assumes that every member of faculty j weighs util-
ity from the average status of the faculty by the same factor (technically, we assume an
additively separable utility function). Given that there are arguments for deviations in both
directions (high status members derive more or less utility from the average status as com-
pared to the low status members), it seems natural to assume identical weights for marginal
utility from average status across all faculty members. We discuss relaxing this assumption
in Sect. 5.
Beforeweintroducethenewcandidate,letusbrieﬂyspelloutsomenotation.Formember
k with status sk in faculty j the average status of all other faculty members is:
ˆ s
k
j =

j si −sk
Nj −1
. (2)
We assume that faculty A is the more exclusive faculty. That is, the average status in fac-
ulty A as well as the status utility enjoyed by the median member is higher than in faculty B:
ˆ sA ≡

Asi
NA
>

B si
NB
≡ˆ sB and ˆ s
m
A > ˆ s
m
B. (3)
4See Sect. 5 and Appendix B.1 for details.
5In Sect. 5 and Appendix B.3, we analyze the effects of “localized” matching, according to which a member
has larger probability of interacting with other members of equal status than with colleagues of higher or
lower status. This leads to positive assortative matching. We show that the results of our baseline model are
robust to the corresponding change in expected utility.
6Subscripts denote faculties, and superscripts denote individuals.Public Choice
We assume all incumbent faculty members to be immobile because of switching costs. In
contrast, the candidates, newly graduated Ph.D.s, for instance, are mobile and can choose to
apply at any of the two faculties.7 A candidate who is accepted as new member of a faculty
affects both arguments of the utility function of the incumbent faculty members. First, by
entering faculty j the new candidate, with status value sC, changes the average status value
enjoyed by incumbent member k to:
ˆ s
k
j =

j si −sk +sC
Nj
. (4)
If candidate C is admitted to a faculty, he also gains via interaction with the other mem-
bers. Second, he receives a wage Wj in faculty j. However, by joining a particular faculty,
a new member foregoes the beneﬁts, denoted by R ≥ 0, he would receive from working in
another, non-academic profession. As the average status of j’s members from the perspec-
tive of a new member equals the average status of the incumbent members, ˆ sj, the utility
function of candidate C entering faculty j is:
u
C
j =ˆ sj +Wj −R. (5)
Note that Wj is not discounted by α in the candidate’s utility function because there are no
rules that prohibit him from spending the wage as he wishes. This is different for incumbent
faculty members and reﬂects institutional rules in most universities.
We model the competition among the two faculties for new entrants as a two-stage game.
At the ﬁrst stage, both faculties A and B simultaneously decide whether they are willing
to allow the candidate to enter at all, that is they choose a minimal status level, sj,min,t h a t
the entrant must satisfy. They also make take-it-or-leave-it wage offers, Wj, to the new
candidate. At the second stage, the new entrant can choose to apply to join either of the
two faculties that provides him with the greater nonnegative utility and accepts his entry. At
both stages of the game, complete information prevails. We solve this game by backward
induction for a subgame-perfect solution.
4 Entry decisions and voting
Before we turn to the analysis of the details of the decision making process, we need to show
that the utility gain from entry of the candidate for incumbent faculty members is strictly
monotonic in the member’s rank because only then does the median voter theorem apply
under majority voting.
The utility differential, that is the post-entry utility minus the pre-entry utility of the k-th
individual in faculty j,i s :
 
k
j =

j si −sk +sC
Nj
−α
Wj
Nj
−

j si −sk
Nj −1
=
sC
Nj
−

j si −sk
Nj(Nj −1)
−
αWj
Nj
, (6)
7We will discuss this assumption further in Sect. 5.Public Choice
which is strictly increasing in sC and sk (given that the aggregate status in faculty j is
held constant). Since a higher sk corresponds to a higher k, the utility differential is also
increasing in the rank k within the faculty. Therefore we obtain:
Lemma 1 (Admission incentives) Incumbent faculty members with lower status rank gain
less from a candidate’s entry than members with higher status rank. Thus, the minimal status
level of a new member required by an individual incumbent member k is lower the higher is
that member’s status rank.
Understanding this lemma is key to the remainder of the results of this paper. Without
entry the lowest ranking member of faculty j, nj, enjoys a gross status utility of

j si−s(nj)
Nj−1 ,
which is strictly larger than the highest ranking member’s, ¯ nj’s, utility,

j si−s(¯ nj)
Nj−1 .G i v e n
that every existing faculty member is willing to vote positively for a prospective new hire
as long as it provides a nonnegative utility differential, the highest-ranked member is more
liberal than the one with the lowest status. That is, he accepts candidates with less than min-
imum status (see details in Sect. 4.2). Between the two extremes, gains from collaboration
are monotonic. This implies that the median voter theorem applies under majority voting.
Hence, we can focus on the pivotal median member for the remainder of the analysis.
Upon the entry of any new member, the advantage of low ranking incumbent members
over high ranking members is diluted. Hence, nj suffers more than proportionally from
e n t r y ,w h i c hi se x p r e s s e db y( 6). The intuition behind this is that the gross beneﬁt from in-
teraction with the new member is equal for all incumbent members. To receive this beneﬁt,
however, high status members only give up some interaction with colleagues of compara-
tively low status. Instead, lower tier members give up some interaction with their high status
colleagues. It follows that the relative differential status value of the new hire to incum-
bent faculty members is increasing in the status rank of the incumbent members. An entrant
who participates in social interaction with high status faculty fellows therefore crowds out
interactions with incumbent low status members of the faculty.
4.1 The candidate’s decisions
In the ﬁnal stage of the game the entrant has to make two decisions: should he join a faculty
at all and, if so, which one? The candidate will be willing to join a faculty j if the utility this
option offers is positive:
ˆ sj +Wj −R ≥ 0. (7)
We will refer to this inequality as the participation constraint of the entrant to faculty j,
(PCj). It implies that the candidate is willing to enter j if, and only if, the expected gains
from interaction with the other faculty members and the wage offered are not lower than his
opportunity cost of pursuing a non-academic career.
Given that the newcomer joins either faculty, he will choose the one that offers him the
larger net utility, meaning that he will prefer faculty j over faculty q if:
ˆ sj +Wj > ˆ sq +Wq. (8)
If the utilities are equal, which we will refer to as the indifference condition ( I C )o ft h e
entrant, we will assume that the candidate will join faculty A. By using this assumption andPublic Choice
rearranging (8), we know that faculty A will attract the candidate if the wage it offers and
the status advantage it has over faculty B are not smaller than the wage offered by B:
WA = WB −(ˆ sA −ˆ sB). (9)
Given the anticipated behavior of the entrant, we will now address the optimal behavior
of the faculties.
4.2 The choices of the faculties
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, faculties A and B compete by simultaneously choosing a min-
imal status level for job candidates (sj,min) and a wage rate (Wj), taking into consideration
the candidate’s reaction.
The decision problem of the median member of faculty j is to maximize the utility
differential  
mj
j that he will individually receive from entry of the candidate subject to the
candidate’s willingness to join faculty j (and not the other faculty, q):
Max
sj,min;Wj
argmax

 
mj
j ,0

s.t.
ˆ sj +Wj −R ≥ 0,
ˆ sj +Wj > ˆ sq +Wq,
(10)
where
 
mj
j =
sC
Nj
−

j si −smj
Nj(Nj −1)
−
αWj
Nj
. (11)
Note that the second side constraint may hold with equality for faculty A.
As a ﬁrst step towards characterizing the subgame-perfect equilibrium we analyze the
minimal status requirements of the respective faculties as a function of the wages offered.
Therefore, we use the indifference condition, which faculty A must ensure that it holds, and
solve  
mj
j = 0f o rsC. This yields:
sA,min(WB) =

Asi −smA
NA −1
−α ·

Asi
NA
−

B si
NB

+αWB, (12)
sB,min(WB) =

B si −smB
NB −1
+αWB. (13)
For presentational simplicity, we rewrite (12)a n d( 13)a s : 8
sA,min(WB) =ˆ s
mA
A −α(ˆ sA −ˆ sB)+αWB, (14)
sB,min(WB) =ˆ s
mB
B +αWB. (15)
8Recall that ˆ s
mj
j refers to the status utility enjoyed by the median member of faculty j, whereas ˆ sj refers to
the average status of faculty j, which coincides with the status utility enjoyed by an entrant to j.Public Choice
Since  
mj
j isstrictlyincreasingin sC,thisimpliesthatfaculty j willnotmakeanyaccept-
able offer to candidates with sC <s j,min. Comparing the minimal status position determined
by the two faculties we ﬁnd:
sA,min −sB,min =ˆ s
mA
A −ˆ s
mB
B +α(ˆ sB −ˆ sA). (16)
Note that (16) is independent of the wages offered by the faculties. This fact, which stems
from the assumed symmetry across faculties with respect to α and the additively separable
utility function, allows for independent analysis of the faculties’ choices of minimal status
requirement and wage offered. The ﬁrst difference on the RHS of (16) reﬂects the (positive)
difference in the “willingness-to-accept” a certain candidate associated with the impact on
the ex ante utility enjoyed by the median member in faculty A compared to his counterpart
in faculty B. In contrast, the second term in (16) reﬂects the “necessity-to-pay” for a new
member by faculty A relative to the one in faculty B. This difference is negative because
every new entrant gains relatively more when entering faculty A than faculty B,g i v e nt h e
higher average status level in faculty A. This implies that the new member is willing to
accept a lower salary offer from faculty A than from faculty B. The sign of the RHS of (16)
depends, thus, on the relative impact of the two effects.
Proposition 1 (Entry thresholds) Let z ≡ min{1,
ˆ s
mA
A −ˆ s
mB
B
ˆ sA−ˆ sB }. Then,
(i) Given that substitution between different budgetary issues is difﬁcult (α<z ), the re-
quired minimal status position of faculty B is strictly lower than the one of faculty A
(that is, sA,min >s B,min ∀WB).
(ii) With budgetary substitution being rather simple (α ≥ z), faculty B is more restrictive
than faculty A (that is, sA,min ≤ sB,min ∀WB).
The second part of Proposition 1 emerges if and only if the status distributions of the
two faculties are skewed differently. If the difference between median and average status
level in both faculties is the same (or smaller in A than in B), then z = 1, which implies
(because α is assumed to be strictly smaller than one) that only case (i) is feasible. With
all other status distributions, the second case becomes feasible but will emerge only if α is
sufﬁciently large. This occurs only if an increase in the ﬁnancial resources of the faculty are
nearly as valuable for incumbent faculty members as an increase in own salary. Given that
the main focus of our analysis is on faculties in which the social interaction among members
leads to improved research outcomes, this is not the point of interest in the current paper.
Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on case (i) of Proposition 1.9
Before we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium, let us deﬁne the following wage
levels. The minimal salary a candidate might accept from faculty B is given by:
W
E
B ≡ R −ˆ sB.
9Note that the implications of the second case for the analysis in this section are quite straightforward (the
results in all other sections remain unchanged): If faculty A is less restrictive than faculty B (sA,min ≤
sB,min), a candidate will enter faculty A independent of his own status sC because A is, for any given wage
level WB, more attractive for the candidate and more willing to accept new members than faculty B. Hence,
if α ≥ z, no candidate will join faculty B.Public Choice
Fig. 1 Stratiﬁed segmentation of
candidates in faculties A and B
The minimal competitive salary of faculty B, still allowing faculty B to attract the new
candidate, is given by:
W
+
B ≡ (ˆ sA −ˆ sB)+
sC
α
−
ˆ s
mA
A
α
+ ,
where   is the smallest feasible monetary unit. Furthermore, we deﬁne the minimal salary
offered by faculty A that lets the candidate’s IC (indifference condition) hold if faculty B
offers the candidate its entire hiring budget, T, as wage:
˜ WA ≡ T −(ˆ sA −ˆ sB).
We prove in the Appendix A:
Proposition2(Equilibriumwithmajorityvoting) Assumethat α<
ˆ s
mj
j −s
ˆ sj ∀j.Thesubgame-
perfect equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
(i) Region IV: A candidate with very low status, sC <s B,min(WE
B ), does not get an accept-
able offer from either faculty.
(ii) Region III: A candidate with low status level, sC ∈[ sB,min(WE
B ),sA,min(WE
B )), gets an
acceptable offer only from faculty B, which he accepts. WB = WE
B .
(iii) Region II: A candidate with medium status level, sC ∈[ sA,min(WE
B ),sA,min(WB = T)),
receives acceptable offers from both faculties. He joins faculty B for a wage WB = W
+
B .
(iv) Region I: A candidate with high status level, sC ≥ sA,min(WB = T), receives acceptable
offers from both faculties. He joins faculty A for a wage of WA = ˜ WA.
(v) The faculty losing the competition for the candidate in a region offers a wage as com-
petitive as possible (such that  
mj
j = 0 for that faculty’s median member).
If α ≥
ˆ s
mB
B −s
ˆ sB , region IV does not exist and all candidates are accepted by some faculty.
If α ≥
ˆ s
mA
A −s
ˆ sA , region III also does not exist. As these two cases do not affect our main
predictions, namely that some candidates enter faculty A for this wage whereas others enter
faculty B for that wage, we will analyze the full spectrum of regions as characterized in
Proposition 2.
Figures 1 (delineating the allocation of entrants to faculties) and 2 (plotting the wage
paid by the “winning” faculty) illustrate Proposition 2.Public Choice
Fig. 2 Wage paid by the
“winning” faculty
In region IV, there is no wage that satisﬁes a candidate’s participation constraint and pro-
duces a nonnegative utility differential for the median member mB (let alone mA). Thus,
candidates in this region stick with their outside option. For candidates in region III, fac-
ulty B is protected from competition by faculty A as the median voter of faculty A would
want to compete with for the candidate only if the wage offer is quite low. This would,
however, violate (PC A). In region I, on the other hand, faculty A is protected from in-
tense competition. Because of its budget constraint, T, faculty B is not able to offer a high
status candidate a package of an attractive research environment and a wage that exceeds
faculty A’s. In region II, competition for the candidate is most intense: neither faculty is
protected from competitive bids by the other faculty. Due to the impact of WB on sA,min,
however, faculty B can offer a wage, W
+
B , that is sufﬁciently attractive for the candidate
such that an equally attractive wage offer from faculty A would turn the utility differential
of A’s median member slightly negative. Consequently, the candidate will enter faculty B.
The intuition of Proposition 2.(v) is that the “losing” faculty j neither has an incentive
to bid a higher wage than the most competitive wage (as it would violate sj,min and make
 
mj
j < 0) nor to propose a lower wage (this would make membership in faculty j even less
attractive for the candidate and would not change mj’s surplus of zero). Given this strategy
of the losing faculty, the “winning” faculty’s best response, according to the arguments
above, is to offer WE
B , W
+
B and ˜ WA in the respective regions III to I.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2 we have the following:
Corollary 1 (Wage levels) In equilibrium the highest ranking candidates (in region I) re-
ceive lower wages than some candidates with relatively lower status (the best in region II).
In other words, top ranking researchers join a top ranking faculty for comparatively low
remuneration, whereas some researchers with lower status join lower ranking faculties for a
comparatively high salary. Figure 2 illustrates this idea.10
4.3 The allocation of surplus
To enable us to study the effects of competition for candidates on the utility of all individuals
involved, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we analyze how the surplus created by entry
10Note that in Fig. 2 we plotted the equilibrium wages of the winning faculty for ˆ sA < 2ˆ sB + T − R.I ft h i s
inequality did not hold, we would have WE
B ≥ ˜ WA. In region II, W+
B would adjust accordingly, starting from
the low level of WE
B at sA,min(WE
B ) and increasing linearly to a value of T at sA,min(WB = T).Public Choice
of a candidate is divided among the three key players: the median members of faculties A
and B, and the candidate. Second, we analyze the distribution of surplus within the faculty
that hires the candidate, the “winning” faculty.
Equation (1) states that, without the entry of a candidate, the median member of faculty j
obtains a utility level of ˆ s
mj
j +αT/Nj. The candidate gets his outside option, R. Conditions
(5)a n d( 6) capture the utility differentials of the three key players conditional on the event
that the candidate enters a faculty, compared to taking their outside options. Henceforth, we
will use the terms utility differential and surplus exchangeably.
By deﬁnition, the utility differential of the “losing” median member, who does not get a
new colleague, is  
mj
j = 0. The utility differential of the winning median member, whose
faculty hires the candidate, is given by (6), which depends on the equilibrium wage. We
prove the following Lemma in the Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2 (Surplus division between the key players) (i): In region IV, the surplus of all
three key players is zero. (ii): In region III, only the median member of faculty B enjoys
positive surplus, which is increasing in the status of the candidate. (iii): In region II, only
the candidate gains positive surplus, which is increasing in his own status.( i v ) :In region I,
both the candidate and the median member of faculty A receive positive surplus, given that
R is sufﬁciently low, but only the median member’s surplus increases in the candidate’s
status.
Lemma 2 reﬂects the varying degree of competition between the two faculties in the
respective regions, allowing faculty B (A) to achieve a positive surplus in region III (I). The
fact that the two faculties are protected from competition in these two regions implies that
they can capture the entire increase in total surplus that arises if candidates with more status
are hired. In region II, in which competition is intense, it is the candidate who can collect the
entire surplus. In addition, Lemma 2 shows that, depending on the status of the candidate,
each key player can generate a positive surplus from entry at some point.
Now we turn to the question, how is the surplus that is generated by entry of a candidate
distributed within the winning faculty? To answer this question we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the
aggregate surplus of the winning faculty. It is, following (6):
 j ≡

k
 
k
j = s
C −ˆ sj −αWj. (17)
In the next Lemma, which is proven in the Appendix A.3, we state the surplus of the
winning faculty in each region. By deﬁnition, the surplus of the losing faculty is zero. The
surplus of the candidate is given by Lemma 2. In region IV, neither faculty wins.
Lemma 3 (Joint surplus of incumbents of winning faculty) At the lower bound of a region,
the surplus of the winning faculty (j) is:
ˆ s
mj
j −ˆ sj.
The joint surplus of the incumbents of the winning faculty increases with sC in region III
(for faculty B) and in region I (for faculty A), whereas it stays constant in sC in region II.
Lemmas 2 and 3 put us in a situation where we can compare the surplus of the median
member of the winning faculty with the joint surplus of all incumbent faculty members. WePublic Choice
rule out that wages for incumbent faculty members can be adjusted individually after entry
of a candidate to correct for different status levels.11
At the lower bound of each region, the median member of the winning faculty j receives
zero surplus, while the aggregate surplus of his faculty is  j =ˆ s
mj
j −ˆ sj. If this expression
is positive, it implies that a candidate with a status level marginally below the lower bound
of the region is not admitted to the faculty at all or, at least, not admitted for the wage paid
in the equilibrium of the region (see Proposition 2). However, from the aggregate member
perspective, it would have been beneﬁcial to admit the candidate for the equilibrium wage,
that is, it would have been beneﬁcial to lower sj,min. It follows that, in this case, the median
member of the winning faculty implemented a hiring policy that is too restrictive.
In turn, if  j =ˆ s
mj
j −ˆ sj is negative, it implies that a candidate with a status level equal
to the lower bound of the region is admitted to the faculty for the equilibrium wage of
that region. However, from the aggregate perspective, it would have been beneﬁcial not
to admit the candidate for the equilibrium wage, that is, it would have been beneﬁcial to
increase sj,min. Hence, in this case, the median member of the winning faculty implemented
a hiring policy that is too liberal. Based on the above discussion we can state the following
Proposition without a formal proof.
Proposition 3 (Entry and joint surplus of the winning faculty) (i). If ˆ s
mj
j > (<)ˆ sj, the
amount of entry in faculty j is suboptimally low (high) from the perspective of the joint
surplus of incumbent members of faculty j. (ii). For ˆ s
mj
j =ˆ sj, the minimal status threshold
is optimal.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is straightforward if we realize that ˆ s
mj
j > (<)ˆ sj implies
that the median voter is located to the left (right) of the center of the distribution implying
that the median voter is too restrictive (liberal) when deciding on entry. Hence, entry is sub-
optimally low (high). If the median voter is located precisely at the center, this suboptimality
is avoided.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that majority voting is an approximation of an optimal
decision-making rule for faculties in which the status distribution is rather symmetric.
5R o b u s t n e s s
We focus in this section on what we consider the main assumptions of our model and discuss
the implications of relaxing them.
Faculty size The main mechanism in our analysis hinges on the fact that faculty members
with higher status gain relatively more from a new member than members with a lower sta-
tus. This mechanism arises since all incumbent faculty members get the same gross beneﬁt
from the interaction with a new member but they bear different opportunity costs: lower-tier
members have to share opportunities of interacting with higher status members with another
colleague (dilution effect), whereas faculty “stars” give up less. They beneﬁt more from the
budget residual, that is from the monetary contribution left over after admitting a new mem-
ber. The dilution effect is most prevalent with a rather small number of faculty members
11This assumption is in line with the common practice in most academic faculties. The opposite assumption
would obviously come at high transaction costs because the dean would have to solve Nj bargaining games
simultaneously—after every change in faculty composition.Public Choice
and is mitigated as faculty size increases. Therefore, we consider our main mechanism to be
robust as long as we do not study faculties that are very large.
Nonrivalry and different marginal valuations of status Our mechanism rests on two as-
sumptions in the baseline model. (i) Status is a rival good. (ii) Each member of faculty j
assigns the same weight to the utility derived from the average status of the other faculty
members.
In Appendix B.1, we show that our key results, which are based on Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 1, hold both for status being a rival or a partially nonrival good. Relaxing the second
assumption, case (ii), is more complex. We show in Appendix B.2 that Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 1 hold qualitatively if the marginal status utility that a player k gets does neither
increase nor decrease too steeply in his own status rank, sk. We show that, if the weight on
status utility increases too steeply in status rank, faculty A does not leave any candidates
to faculty B that faculty B wants to accept (that is, sA,min ≤ sB,min). If the weight on sta-
tus utility decreases too steeply in status rank, sA,min − sB,min > 0, but grows so large that
faculty A will not make a competitive offer to candidates anymore because it values can-
didates’ status much less than faculty B. In general, given that we observe stratiﬁcation of
faculties and candidates empirically and do not observe that only high ranking or only low
ranking faculties capture the entire job market for academics, we consider our model using
equal valuations of status across faculty members as a better approximation of reality than a
model with rather extreme assumptions of status utility depending on members’ own status.
Positiveassortativematching Inourbaselinemodel,weassumedthatcollaborationamong
faculty members is uniformly distributed, in expectation. In Appendix A.3,w es t u d yt h e
effects of an alternative, yet equally plausible matching pattern. We consider the case where
matches between pairs of faculty members are “localized”, that is that high (low) status
members are more likely to interact with other high (low) status members. This implies
that matching between faculty members is positively assortative. Speciﬁcally, we capture
positive assortative matching by assuming that the utility from membership on a faculty
follows a binomial distribution, where the probability of being matched with high status
members increases in a member’s own status rank.
We show that Lemma 1 is unaffected by this assumption: the minimal status requirement
for new faculty hires still decreases strictly and monotonically in rank. Proposition 1,w h i c h
lays the foundation for our main result, Proposition 2, is even strengthened as there are cases
where the relation of α and z is irrelevant for Proposition 1.(i) to hold.
Asymmetric utility functions between members and candidates We assumed symmetry of
the utility functions between incumbent faculty members, on the one side, and candidates,
on the other. If, for instance, the candidate values status less than money (as compared to
incumbent faculty members), the competitive advantage of faculty A decreases. The differ-
ence in wages becomes more important. This effect becomes most obvious if the candidate
is interested only in wage offers. A new entrant with high status is relatively more attractive
for faculty B than for faculty A (since the effect on average status is more pronounced for
faculty B). Hence, faculty B is able and willing to attract high status candidates. A poten-
tially relevant application of this might be if highly reputable professors prefer second-tier
universities, thereby making more money than by joining a top-university. In the absence
of compelling reasons to expect systematic differences in preferences, we believe that the
assumption of symmetric preferences is the most reasonable.Public Choice
Relaxing budget constraints The driving force of our analysis is the trade-off between
utility from status and from money. As long as there is any budget constraint for the two
faculties (allowing for the non-existence of budget constraints obviously is implausible), the
quality of our results remains intact. If we start from our initial assumption and relax budget
constraints, faculty B can compete more ﬁercely with faculty A in monetary terms, that is,
it can offer a higher wage. This change leads to a shrinking of region I but it leaves all other
results intact.
Repeated interaction If we extend the one-shot game in our baseline model to a repeated
game setting, the results will depend on the shape of the ex ante and the ex post (after entry
took place once) frequency distributions of members in both faculties. What is important for
our analysis is the insight that our results are robust in each stage of the game as long as it
complies with our parameter setting in Proposition 1.(i).
Many competing faculties Are our results robust to an extension to many faculties? Con-
sider the case in which the status of a new candidate is drawn from a distribution over
[x, ¯ x],w h e r ex   s and ¯ x  ¯ s. Assume that, out of many vertically stratiﬁed faculties, we
focus on faculties Z, A,a n dB, where faculty Z has a higher average status than faculty
A, which is in turn of higher average status than B. Assumption (3) holds here as well.
When determining the entry regions, as in Proposition 2, the threshold between faculties
A and B remains sA,min(WB = T). However, in this setting faculty A also faces competi-
tion from the higher status faculty Z. Taking the intuition of Proposition 1 into account,
faculty A has incentives to offer a higher wage than faculty Z to any new candidate, un-
til its budget constraint becomes binding, at T . We conclude that we can expect entry
in faculty A for all new candidates with sC ∈[ sA,min(WB = T),s Z,min(WA = T)],w h e r e
sA,min(WB = T)=ˆ s
mA
A −α(ˆ sA −ˆ sB)+αT and sZ,min(WB = T)=ˆ s
mZ
Z −α(ˆ sZ −ˆ sA)+αT.
This interval is non-empty for:
α<
ˆ s
mZ
Z −ˆ s
mA
A
ˆ sZ +ˆ sB −2ˆ sA
. (18)
Then each faculty has a positive probability of gaining the candidate as a new member in
equilibrium. Wages are determined according to the result of region II, the most competitive
region in our basic setting.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have studied the competition among academic faculties for job candi-
dates, in which the incumbent members have authority over recruitment of new members.
The main—and novel—assumption of our model is that faculties are status organizations,
wherein a member’s utility depends on the average research capability of his fellow mem-
bers. Thus, utility from faculty membership differs among all members, unless they have the
same status.
We have shown that high status faculty members set a lower status threshold for job can-
didates to enter the faculty, that is they are more liberal than low status faculty members. Our
main result is that high status candidates join the higher ranking faculty but for a medium
wage, whereas lower ranking candidates join the lower ranking faculty. Interestingly, the
best candidates joining the lower ranking faculty receive higher wages than the candidates
joining the better faculty. These results are testable empirically.Public Choice
Moreover, we have shown that a majority voting rule, which this study focuses on, can
create too much or too little entry, from the aggregate faculty members’ perspective. These
inefﬁciencies are avoided in faculties where the status of all members is distributed symmet-
rically around the mean.
Our model applies to a wide range of potential applications beyond our particular ex-
ample of academic institutions. The deﬁning characteristics are, ﬁrst, that members’ utility
depends on the status positions of their fellow members. Second, the organizations must be
member-owned, that is the incumbent members possess the decision rights over the entry of
future members. Third, money and status are not perfect substitutes.
In the baseline model, we have focused on academic faculties, implying that new entrants
receive wages rather than pay entrance fees. However, our analysis is not restricted to this
case. If we deﬁne Wj ≤ 0 to be a fee paid by a candidate to an organization, our full analysis
also applies. In this case we could even lift two restrictions of the baseline model and allow
for positive and negative Ts (total recruitment budgets) as well as positive and negative Rs
(the returns available to candidates in their outside options). The highest ranking candidates
would still join the better organization but pay a larger entry fee than some lower ranking
candidates (cf. Corollary 1). All other results hold accordingly.
This generalizability allows for a transfer of our ﬁndings to a wide variety of organiza-
tions and institutions, including country clubs, golf clubs, and student clubs. It also applies
to international economic institutions, such as the European Currency Union or the World
Trade Organization, and to mutual fund insurances.
There are a number of avenues for future research. First, we have assumed in this ﬁrst
model of its kind that status is a unidimensional vertically differentiable variable. Relax-
ing this assumption by allowing both faculties and candidates also to position themselves
on a horizontal dimension may trigger interesting strategic interactions. A more ambitious
extension would relax the assumption of majority voting and endogenize the governance
structure of academic faculties. For this purpose it would be necessary to deﬁne (and jus-
tify) the objective functions of all players who could have property rights with respect to
faculty governance, including purely administrative (nonacademic) deans and university ex-
ecutive boards. Related to this approach, analyzing the implications of competition among
investor-ownedclubs(suchassomeprofessionalsportsclubs)wouldbeparticularlyinterest-
ing. Here, too, it would be crucial to start by deﬁning the objective functions of the members
of such organizations.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
(i): Because of Proposition 1.(i), the cut-off status level below which candidates do not get
an acceptable offer from any faculty is determined by faculty B. WE
B denotes the salaryPublic Choice
for which (PC B) of the entrant just holds with equality. As sB,min is increasing in WB,
sB,min(WE
B ) is the lowest status level at which faculty B makes an offer that meets (PC B).
(ii): By deﬁnition of sA,min, in the range sC ∈[ sB,min(WE
B ),sA,min(WE
B )) faculty A is not
able to make a membership offer to the candidate that satisﬁes both parties (independently
of faculty B’s behavior). Therefore, faculty B is able to exploit the candidate completely,
which means setting WB = WE
B .
(iii): For sC ≥ sA,min(WE
B ), demanding WB = WE
B has the consequence that faculty A
has an incentive to match the offer of faculty B. The candidate would then join faculty A.
In the range sC ∈[ sA,min(WE
B ),sA,min(WB = T)), however, faculty B can make sure that
sA,min(WB)>s C >s B,min(WB). Thus, faculty A has no incentive to offer the candidate entry
with a salary that would both meet (PC A) and make him prefer membership in faculty A
over faculty B.Becauseofthesecondpartofthisinequality,faculty B stillhasthisincentive,
though. As an increase in wages increases sA,min and sB,min by the same factor, α (see (14)
and (15)), B can sustain this behavior throughout region II. By using (14) we can ﬁnd W
+
B
as deﬁned above, whereby   denotes a very small number and (∂W
+
B )/(∂sC)>0. Hence,
an entrant with sC very close to sA,min(WB = T)receives almost the maximum wage that
faculty B can pay given its budget.
(iv): Because of the budget constraint of faculty B, WB cannot be increased indeﬁnitely.
Hence, faculty B has no way of preventing faculty A from making offers to candidates
with sC ≥ sA,min(WB = T)that are mutually beneﬁcial. Faculty A can let the indifference
condition (and the participation constraint) of the candidate hold. Comparing (7)a n d( 9)
reveals that, from the point of view of faculty A,( 9) is (weakly) more restrictive if WB ≥
R −ˆ sB,t h a ti si f( PC B) holds. This condition holds ∀sC ≥ sB,min(WE
B ), that is in regions
III, II, and I. This result implies that, if faculty A offers a wage in region I for which the
indifference condition holds, the participation constraint holds, too. Thus, faculty A offers
a wage level which is equal to the difference of the average status levels between the two
faculties from the point of view of the entrant. This consideration yields WA = ˜ WA.
(v): The faculty losing the competition for the candidate (both faculties in region IV,
faculty A in regions III and II, faculty B in region I) gets an expected surplus of zero,
no matter which strategy it employs. If it plays the most competitive strategy and offers a
(sj,min,W j)-combination such that  
mj
j = 0, it still has no incentives to deviate. However,
it ensures that the actions characterized in parts (i)–(iv) of the Proposition are incentive-
compatible.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The surplus of the key players is captured by  
mA
A , 
mB
B , and  C.
(i). In region IV, no entry takes place. Hence, there we have  
mA
A =  
mB
B =  C = 0.
(ii). In region III, the candidate chooses to join faculty B but will not get any surplus from
entry as WE
B just pays him his reservation value:  C =  
mA
A = 0. In contrast,  
mB
B (WE
B ) =
1
NB (sC −ˆ s
mB
B −α(R−ˆ sB)). By deﬁnition of sB,min(WE
B ), this expression is zero at its lower
bound. It is increasing in sC.
(iii). In region II, the candidate also joins faculty B. Hence,  
mA
A = 0. Substituting W
+
B in
(6)yields  
mB
B (W
+
B ) = 1
NB (sC−ˆ s
mB
B −α(ˆ sA−ˆ sB+ sC
α −
ˆ s
mA
A
α + )).NotethatsC cancelsfrom
this expression. Bydeﬁnition,  
mB
B (W
+
B ) = 0 at its lower bound,which does notchange over
the course of region II because it is constant in sC. In contrast, the candidate beneﬁts from
higher own status value:  C =
sC−ˆ s
mA
A
α +ˆ sA +   − R. This differential is zero at its lower
bound, sA,min(WE
B ), and grows linearly with increasing sC.Public Choice
(iv). In region I, the candidate joins faculty A. Thus,  
mB
B = 0. Substituting ˜ WA in (6)
yields  
mA
A = 1
NA(sC −ˆ s
mA
A −α(T −(ˆ sA −ˆ sB))). This expression is zero at its lower bound,
sA,min(WB = T), and increases in sC. The candidate receives a utility differential of  C =
T +ˆ sB −R, which is positive for sufﬁciently low R and constant in sC.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In region III,  B = sC − (1 − α)ˆ sB − αR, which is increasing in sC. By deﬁnition of
sB,min(WE
B ), the status level of an admitted candidate in region III is at least sC =ˆ s
mB
B +
α(R −ˆ sB). Substituting this into  B yields  B(sC = sB,min(WE
B )) =ˆ s
mB
B −ˆ sB in the case
of the lowest ranked admitted candidate. Depending on the ex ante frequency distribution of
status in faculty B, this can be positive or negative.
In region II, substituting W
+
B in (17) yields  B =ˆ s
mA
A − αˆ sA − (1 − α)ˆ sB − α . In case
of the lowest ranked candidate admitted in region II, this yields  B(sC = sB,min(W
+
B )) =
ˆ s
mB
B −ˆ sB. Just as in region III, this can be positive or negative. In contrast to region III,  B
is not increasing in sC.
In region I, substituting ˜ WA in (17) yields  A = sC − (1 − α)ˆ sA − αˆ sB − αT,w h i c hi s
increasing in sC. For the lowest ranked candidate admitted in region I, this yields  A(sC =
sA,min(WB = T))=ˆ s
mA
A −ˆ sA. Depending on the ex ante frequency distribution of status in
faculty A, this can be positive or negative.
Appendix B: Alternative model speciﬁcations
B.1 Nonrivalry of status
In our baseline model, the rivalry of status is captured by using the average status of the
faculty as an argument in the utility function. On the other hand, to model status as a com-
pletely nonrival good the sum of the status levels of all other faculty members should be
used. By this approach, a generalization of (2) is given by:
ˆ s
k
j =

j sj −sk
(Nj −1)δ ,
with δ ∈[ 0,1] denoting the degree of rivalry in status. The larger is δ, the larger the degree
of rivalry. With δ close to zero, status is almost completely a nonrival good. With δ = 1w e
are back to our baseline model. This speciﬁcation turns our critical equation (6) into:
 
k
j =
sC
Nδ
j
−
(

j si −sk)(Nδ
j −(Nj −1)δ)
(Nj −1)δNδ
j
−α
Wj
Nj
. (B.1)
Note that the (dis)utility of each incumbent faculty member from paying the new member
a wage is independent of δ because money is a completely rival good. Moreover, note that,
Nδ
j >( N j − 1)δ,∀δ>0; hence ∂ k
j/∂sk > 0 (still assuming that

j si is unaffected when
considering the change in sk). In contrast, for δ = 0, that is, if status is a completely nonrival
good,  k
j reduces to sC − α
Wj
Nj . This case does not depend on the status distribution across
faculties. In other words, if status was a completely nonrival good and budget constraints
were not binding, the larger of the two faculties (with Nj >N q =j) would offer a higher
wage to all candidates independent of their status level. The market would be at a tippingPublic Choice
point. Given that we do not observe such a radical outcome in practice, we proceed in our
analysis for δ>0, that is, if status has at least some rival component. This implies, together
with ∂ k
j/∂sC > 0,∀δ in (B.1), that Lemma 1 is robust.
Proceeding with the analysis of this model speciﬁcation, it is straightforward to see that
(16), comparing the minimal status positions set by the two faculties, remains structurally
unchanged. It follows that Proposition 1 (and all subsequent results) also remains qualita-
tively unchanged if we allow for status to be a partially nonrival good.12
B.2 Different valuation of status across faculty members
In this appendix, we allow for different valuations of fellow faculty members’ status across
faculty members. Obviously, this could go either way. Depending on individual preferences
as well as types of interactions, high status faculty members might beneﬁt more (less) from a
high average status level of the respective faculty as compared to faculty members with low
status. In order to allow for all feasible types of varying valuations of status across different
faculty members we use the following general utility function, related to (1):
u
k
j =

s
k	βˆ s
k
j +α

T −Wj
Nj

(B.2)
where (sk)β measures how the status utility depends on member k’s own status. β ∈ R spec-
iﬁes the marginal utility that k gets from collaboration.13 For β>0( β<0), the marginal
status utility is higher (lower) for highly ranked members than for lowly ranked members.
For β = 0, that is, the in-between case, the marginal status utility from entry is independent
of k’s own rank, which is the case in our baseline model.
Using this speciﬁcation of the utility function, (6) turns into:
 
k
j =
1
Nj

s
k	β

s
C +
sk −

j si
(Nj −1)

−αWj

. (B.3)
We ﬁnd that ∂ k
j/∂sC > 0 (given that

j si is unaffected by the change in sk)a n d
sign
∂ k
j
∂sk = sign

βs
C +
(1+β)sk −β

j si
Nj −1

.
Hence, β not being too large (in absolute terms) is a sufﬁcient condition for Lemma 1 to
hold. If β > (<)0a n d(Nj − 1)sC +
β+1
β sk −

j si > (<)0, this restriction is not needed
for Lemma 1 to hold.
Turning to Proposition 1, after some algebra we get the equivalent of (16):
sA,min −sB,min =ˆ s
mA
A −ˆ s
mB
B −α

sC
smA
β
(ˆ sA −ˆ sB)+

1
(smA)β −
1
(smB)β

αWB. (B.4)
In consequence, Proposition 1 holds but it depends on the adjusted condition:
z ≡ min


1,
ˆ s
mA
A −ˆ s
mB
B
( sC
smA )β(ˆ sA −ˆ sB)+( 1
(smB )β − 1
(smA)β )WB

. (B.5)
12As the only quantitative difference, z in Proposition 1 w o u l da l s od e p e n do nt h el e v e lo fδ.
13Note that the superscript k in sk denotes member k, whereas β denotes the power of sk.Public Choice
Note that Proposition 1.(i) holds with (B.5) as upper bound for β>0. For β<0, we
have 1
(smB )β < 1
(smA)β and, thus, (B.5) becomes the lower bound for Proposition 1.(i), and
vice versa for Proposition 1.(ii). This implies that, for β>0, if sC is not very much lower
than smA,t h e nz decreases with increasing β but z may still be positive because WB has an
upper bound, T. Proposition 1 then holds qualitatively.
B.3 Positive assortative matching
Here we consider the case where matches between pairs of faculty members are “localized”,
that is that high (low) status members are more likely to interact with other high (low) status
members. This implies that matching between faculty members is positively assortative.
Since the focus of this paper is not on the details of the matching procedure but on the
effects of a certain matching rule on competition among faculties, we use a reduced form
approach to get positive assortative matching.14 Moreover, we want to capture the idea that,
at the point of time when faculties decide the offer they will make to a candidate, there is
some uncertainty about the identity of a member’s next research partner/match.
Members of faculty j are ordered in rank where the member with the lowest status, snj,
has rank 0 and the member with the highest status, s ¯ nj,h a sr a n kNj − 1. Member k has
rank K. For simplicity, we assume that status is proportional to rank within the faculty:
sk = Kj +μK,w h e r eμ>0a n dKA >KB.
We capture positive assortative matching by assuming that the status utility member k
expects from membership in faculty j, uk
j, follows a binomial distribution, where uk
j ∼
B(n,p). In our model, p = K
Nj (capturing the localized matching effect) and n =

j si −sk
(capturing theexpected payoffsfromthecollaboration effect). Hence,abstracting fromwage
effects, we model the utility realized by member k in faculty j as being distributed according
to
u
k
j ∼ B

j
s
i −s
k,
K
Nj

. (B.6)
By deﬁnition, the binomial distribution has mean np, which implies that, for risk-neutral
members, the expected status utility of member k corresponds to
ˆ s
k
j =

j
s
i −s
k

K
Nj
. (B.7)
If candidate C enters faculty j, this has three effects on the utility of member k.F i r s t ,i t
dilutes k’s expected utility from collaborating with his pre-entry fellow members. Second,
it increases k’s expected utility because k might be matched with C in the future. Third,
it decreases k’s expected utility because the wage of C can no longer be used to ﬁnance
amenities for other faculty members. Therefore, the utility differential of member k,t h e
analog of (6), is:
 
k
j =
K
Nj +1

j
s
i −s
k +s
C

−
K
Nj

j
s
i −s
k

−α
Wj
Nj
. (B.8)
14For a detailed treatment of positive assortative matching equilibria, see Becker (1974), Kremer (1993),
Legros and Newman (2007), or Damiano et al. (2010).Public Choice
Usingsk = Kj +μK and,consequently,

j si = NjKj +μ(0+···+Nj −1) = NjKj +
μ(Nj −1)
Nj
2 , we can rewrite (B.8):
 
k
j =
KsC
Nj +1
+
K(μK−μ(Nj −1)
Nj
2 −(Nj −1)Kj)
Nj(Nj +1)
−α
Wj
Nj
. (B.9)
Setting  k
j equal to zero and solving for sC yields the minimum status that member k
would require from candidate C if k was faculty j’s decision maker:
s
k
j,min =
1
Nj

μ(Nj −1)
Nj
2
−μK +(Nj −1)Kj

+α
Wj(Nj +1)
KNj
. (B.10)
sk
j,min strictly and monotonically decreases in K, i.e., in rank within faculty j. Hence,
the median voter theorem applies under majority voting. Moreover, this result proves that
Lemma 1 holds for the positive assortative matching model: the required status of the can-
didate is lower the higher the rank of the pivotal member of the existing faculty.
In this setting, the status of faculty j’s median member is smj = Kj +
Nj−1
2 . Thus, if the
median member decides, we have:
s
m
j,min =
Nj −1
Nj

Kj +μ
Nj −1
2

+2α
Wj(Nj +1)
Nj(Nj −1)
. (B.11)
Related to (B.8), candidate C expects from entry in faculty j:
KC
j
Nj +1

j
s
i +Wj =
KC
j
Nj +1

NjKj +μNj
Nj −1
2

+Wj, (B.12)
where KC
j = KC
j (sC) denotes C’sstatusrankwithinfaculty j.Itfollowsthattheindifference
condition, that is the minimum wage that makes C join faculty A and not B,i s :
WA = WB −

KC
A
NA +1

NAKA +μNA
NA −1
2

−
KC
B
NB +1

NBKB +μNB
NB −1
2

. (B.13)
After the substitution of (B.13)i n( B.11), we can compare the minimal status positions
required by both faculties. To facilitate interpretation, weassume that the size of the faculties
is equal: NA = NB = N.15 Then we can write:
s
m
A,min −s
m
B,min =
N −1
N
(KA −KB)
+
α
N −1

K
C
B

KB +μ
N −1
2

−K
C
A

KA +μ
N −1
2

. (B.14)
15Simple inspection of (B.13) reveals that differences in faculty size would have to be substantial to outweigh
differences in KC
A/KC
B or KA/KB.Public Choice
In our baseline model, the key result, Proposition 2, depends on the validity of Proposi-
tion1.(i),whichrequiresthat sA,min >s B,min.Itisstraightforwardtoanalyze(B.14)regarding
this condition:
• For α → 0, given that KA >K B, by deﬁnition, sA,min >s B,min. This means that, if the
budget remaining after hiring cannot be used for other faculty amenities, the high status
faculty A will demand a strictly higher status from new members than will low status
faculty B.
• For α>0, given that KA >K B but KC
A <K C
B (the candidate would have to accept a
lower rank in the high status faculty than in the low status faculty), the sign of the second
term in (B.14) is ambiguous.
–F o rKAKC
A >K BKC
B, membership in faculty A is so attractive for C that he accepts
a relatively low wage there, just as in our baseline model. This makes it cheaper for
faculty A to hire the candidate: sA,min − sB,min sinks. As long as α is not too high,
the negative effect of the second term in (B.14) does not outweigh the positive effect
of the ﬁrst term, though. Proposition 1.(i) holds qualitatively (with a slightly adjusted
threshold value z).
–F o rKAKC
A <K BKC
B, the higher rank that the candidate can obtain in faculty B out-
weighs the lower status of faculty B members, from C’s perspective. Then, both terms
in (B.14) are positive, which implies that there is not even an upper threshold z on α.
We conclude that the positive assortative matching model even strengthens Proposi-
tion 1.(i) of our baseline model. All subsequent results thus also are robust.
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